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This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major 
decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates 
among children of poor households in Brazil. We show that while this federal program 
successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program’s impact was 36 
percent larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities 
compared to those with lame-duck mayors. First term mayors with good program 
performance were much more likely to get re-elected. These mayors adopted program 
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Many countries have decentralized the implementation of public programs to locally-elected 
governments in seeking efficiency gains in performance (Bardhan, 2002). The expectation is that 
local governments have unique advantages in allocating public resources, such as access to 
information not available to central authorities (Faguet, 2004).  
In practice, however, decentralized program implementation may not meet this 
expectation. Although the informational advantages associated with decentralization have been 
shown to exist (Alderman, 2002), use of this information for efficient program implementation 
depends on whether local governments can in fact be held accountable to constituents for their 
efforts (Seabright, 1996; World Bank, 2003). How to achieve this has long been debated (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999). The accountability of local governments to program stakeholders requires 
political institutions that give citizens the ability to discipline elected officials (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2002). This may be missing. For instance, term limits may curtail incentives for 
politicians to make efforts in providing high quality local public goods when they can no longer 
seek re-election (Besley, 2006). Local politicians’ performance in program implementation 
would thus depend on existence of electoral incentives for them to make good use of the 
informational advantages they possess.  
In this paper, we investigate the extent to which local electoral incentives affect the level 
of impact of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer (CCT) program in Brazil – Bolsa 
Escola – designed to reduce school dropout among the children of the poor. Although Bolsa 
Escola, now part of a broader program called Bolsa Familia, was a federal program, municipal 
governments were responsible for identifying beneficiaries and enforcing conditionalities. This 
created substantial variation across municipalities in the manner in which the program was 
implemented and in its impact. Using an extensive dataset that combines a municipal survey with 
school records for 290,517 children over the period 1999 to 2003 (with two years before the 
program and three years under the program), we estimate the program’s impact on primary and 
secondary school dropout rates for each of 261 municipalities in the Northeast of Brazil. We then 
identify the impact of municipal electoral incentives on local politicians’ program performance 
by using the constitutional two-term limit for re-election and measuring the difference in 
achievement between first and second-term mayors. While many studies in constitutional 
2 economics have posited the importance of electoral incentives for effective decentralized 
services delivery (World Bank, 2003), this study is among the first to support this empirically. 
We find that while, on average, the program reduced dropout rates during the school year 
by 8 percentage points, there was considerable variation across municipalities. Municipalities 
that happened to be governed by a first-term mayor had an estimated 36 percent higher program 
performance compared to municipalities governed by a second-term mayor. This difference 
persists when comparing second-term mayors to first-term mayors that got re-elected in the 
subsequent election, thus controlling for revealed ability, and to mayors with a comparable level 
of political experience.  
Using municipal level election data, we show that first-term mayors had reason to care 
about good program performance. The probability of re-election was 28 percent higher for 
mayors who were in the top quartile of program impacts. Mayors with no public denouncements 
of inclusion errors were also rewarded with a 26 percent higher probability of re-election. We 
show that a number of good management practices related to transparency that affect program 
performance were more frequently associated with first than second-term mayors, indicating how 
better performance actually came about. 
  Our findings contribute to a growing empirical literature in constitutional economics that 
emphasizes the importance of electoral accountability in aligning politicians’ actions with voters’ 
preferences. Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) show in Indian villages that greater electoral 
competition in controlling governing bodies and a higher share of poor landless in the voting 
population increase the allocation of public budgets toward pro-poor local public goods. Besley 
and Case (1995) found that re-election incentives affect the fiscal policy decisions of U.S. 
governors. Consistent with a model where incumbents who are willing to run again seek to build 
their reputations with the electorate through their achievements, governors with re-election 
possibility make greater efforts to keep taxes and expenditures down relative to those in their 
final term. In a similar vein, List and Sturm (2006) provide evidence that electoral incentives 
influence the environmental policy choices of U.S. governors even though these are not frontline 
policy issues. In states with large groups of green voters, they pursue more environmentally 
friendly policies when they can be re-elected than when they face binding term limits, and vice-
versa in states with small environmental constituencies. Using the outcomes of random audits of 
municipal finances in Brazil, Ferraz and Finan (2009) have shown that mayors that face re-
3 election incentives are significantly less corrupt than mayors without such incentives. While both 
Ferraz and Finan (2009) and this paper analyze the role of local electoral incentives on 
politicians’ performance, the papers differ in a complementary fashion: the first focuses on rents 
extracted via corruption practices while the second focuses on efforts made in achieving public 
program performance. 
  Much of the empirical work on the effectiveness of decentralized services delivery has 
focused on how decentralized programs are targeted, due in large part to the fact that measures of 
program performance were unavailable. For instance, Alderman (2002) has shown that the local-
level informational advantage was used by local authorities in Albania to better target the poor. 
Both Galasso and Ravallion (2005), in the case of public food-for-school transfers in 
Bangladesh, and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006), in the case of credit and agricultural input kits 
in West Bengal villages, found that program and village features affected the degree of local pro-
poorness in the decentralized targeting. But, ultimately, what we care about is the impact of the 
program, and targeting may not be a good indicator of program performance (Ravallion, 2007). 
Our paper, which  complements this literature, is the first empirical study to show how the 
performance of a decentralized program is affected by local institutions, and particularly those 
that help establish local accountability.    
  It is fairly well established that politicians can reap electoral rewards from public 
expenditure programs. Access to government transfers has been shown to increase votes for 
elected officials who can claim credit for the transfers. Levitt and Snyder (1997) thus 
demonstrated that public spending is rewarded by voters’ electoral support in House of 
Representatives elections in the US. Manacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2009) found that 
households who benefited from a cash transfer in Uruguay were more likely to give lasting 
political support to the current relative to the previous government. Our paper extends these 
results by showing that not only are transfers rewarded, but that the quality of the politician’s 
program performance in terms of its intended effects is rewarded by a higher likelihood of being 
re-elected. It is because of this link between program performance and votes that political 
institutions can be such a powerful instrument in enhancing the quality of implementation of 
decentralized public programs.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we propose a model of local electoral 
incentives that highlights the differences in effort in program implementation between first-term 
4 and second-term mayors. In section III, we present the features of the Bolsa Escola program and 
review results obtained in previous evaluations. In section IV, we explain the data collection and 
present descriptive statistics on dropout rates across municipalities. We explain the method for 
measuring program performance at the municipality level in section V. We then report in section 
VI results on the impact of Bolsa Escola on dropout rates. In section VII, we give estimates of 
the gains in performance due to electoral incentives. In section VIII, we interpret the results first 
by verifying that electoral rewards do accompany good program performance and second by 
exploring through which governance practices first term mayors achieve superior program 
performance. We conclude in section IX on the benefits of electoral incentives for decentralized 
program performance. 
 
II. A model of local electoral incentives 
 
In this section, we construct a simple political economy model to show how electoral incentives 
can affect the performance of a decentralized program when its performance depends on efforts 
made by an elected municipal official. The program is one where municipalities must select 
beneficiaries among qualifying households, the number of which exceeds the exogenous quota of 
school stipends that a municipality can allocate. Because qualifying children are heterogeneous 
in their responses to the offer of a stipend, the impact of the program is largely due to the 
selection of beneficiaries. The central government’s objective is to reduce the school dropout 
while the local government’s objective is re-election with a two-term limit. Voters are informed 
of and concerned with municipal program performance. The local electorate can thus reward for 
good performance local politicians who are up for re-election. While improving program 
performance does require politicians to exert costly effort, it does increase their chances of re-
election.
2 
  Following the model set up, the local government must decide whether a child i with 
characteristics zi is selected or not (P i ∈ 0,1 { }), given the number of stipends B allocated to the 
                                                 
2 The model is an adaptation of the standard political agency model found in Barro (1970), Ferejohn (1986), Banks 
and Sundaram (1993), and recently Alesina and Tabellini (2007). The basic insight from this class of models is that 
in a political context in which elections reward politicians’ performances, incumbents with reelection possibilities 
have the incentive to exert effort in the implementation of the program in order to increase their re-election chances.   
5 municipality. The expected program’s impact θi =θ zi ( ) on the school performance of child i 
depends on his characteristics. The program’s impact in the municipality is θ = P iθ
i ∑ zi () . 
From the perspective of the program itself, maximum impact is obtained by giving 
beneficiary status to children with the highest θi , in descending order until the municipal quota 
is reached. However, this first best outcome may be difficult to achieve for at least two reasons. 
First, the objectives of the program and of the mayor may not be entirely aligned. Second, even if 
the mayor was concerned with maximizing program effectiveness in reducing dropout, to 
correctly anticipate a child’s response to the program requires levels of administrative ability and 
effort that the mayor may not have or be willing to provide.  
  To formalize these possibilities, consider a two-period model where citizens choose at the 
end of the first period whether to re-elect the incumbent mayor or not. Voters care about the 
program’s impact θ a,t,e,z,B ( , )  which is influenced by the mayor’s ability a, experience t, and 
effort e, with first derivatives θa, θt , and θe positive, respectively. The mayor’s own utility is 
also a function of his direct reward R from beneficiary selection that can be written as 
, which is decreasing in effort  . To simplify further the derivation of the 
model, we assume that the program impact is 
Ra ,t,e,z,B () Re < 0
θ = gz ,B ( )+ a + t + e, and the politician’s utility is 
R−ψ e () , with ψ e > 0,ψ ee > 0 . As defined here, e represents the effort exerted by the mayor in 
the selection of beneficiaries and the administration of the program. Although more effort does 
increase the program’s impact, the mayor experiences a disutility from exerting effort. 
The timing of events is as follows. First the mayor selects the beneficiaries.  His ability to 
select beneficiaries is a random variable a1 : Φ a,σa
2 ( ), unknown even to him in the first period.  
He chooses the amount of effort to exert in increasing the impact of the program. At the end of 
the first period, voters observe the outcome θ1, but not its decomposition between ability and 
effort. Based on this observation, they decide on whether to re-elect the incumbent or not.  If the 
incumbent is re-elected, his ability is maintained and he has gained experience t. Otherwise, a 
challenger comes in with an ability randomly drawn from the distribution of abilities and no 
experience. In period 2, the mayor chooses again the level of effort to exert, thus determining the 
impact θ2of the program for that period. 
6 Because the game ends in period 2, there is no electoral incentive for mayors to exert any 
effort in the second period.  Thus the program’s impact in the second period is g(z,B)+ a1 +t  if 
the incumbent is reelected, otherwise the expected impact is g(z,B)+ a  otherwise. Unable to 
induce politicians to exert effort, voters will seek to elect the mayor with the highest combination 
of ability and experience. The incumbent is reelected if the impact is higher than a threshold W 
that reveals that he would do better in the future than the average politician. 
The first-term mayor’s inter-temporal objective is: 
max
e R−ψ e () + Pr θ1 ≥W () R. 
The optimal effort   is the solution to  e
* ψ
e
∗ = Rϕ W − gz ,B ( )− e
∗ ( ), where ϕ  is the density 
function of ability. The mayor sets his effort to equate current marginal cost to the future 
marginal benefit of being re-elected.  
Rational voters know that they should expect this optimal level of effort e . They will 
vote the incumbent in if 
∗
θ1 ≥W = g(z,B)+ a + e
∗ −t , which reveals that a1 +t ≥ a .  Substituting 
the expression for W, the optimal effort of the first term mayor is the solution to:  
ψ
e
∗ = Rϕ a − t () . 
  The corresponding program impact of a first-term mayor is: 
  θ1 = gz ,B () + a1 + e
∗, 
while it is  
  θ2 = gz ,B () + a1 + t . 
in his second term impact, if he is re-elected.  First-term mayors exert effort, while second term 
mayor have experience. 
  The average performance across mayors in their first term is: 
  θ1 = gz ,B () + a + e
∗. 
With selection, the average performance of second-term mayors is: 




And the difference is: 
7   θ1 −θ2 = e
∗ − aϕ a ()
a−t
∞






⎥−t .  
The first term is positive and represents the effort exerted by the mayors in their first term 
in response to the re-election incentive, while the two other factors are negative, representing the 
lower average ability and experience of first-term mayors. As this comparison makes explicit, 
the difference in program performance between first and second-term mayors captures both a 
selection effect of the elections, as well as an incentive effect from the possibility of re-election. 
Even though it is difficult to identify each effect separately, a positive difference suggests that 
the incentive effect induced by the possibility of re-election dominates the selection effect of 
having second-term mayors with higher ability and more experience. Implicit in our model is the 
assumption that voters care about the program’s impact. Voters, however, may only care about 
whether they themselves are program beneficiaries. In this case, the incentive politicians have to 
target the program might be quite different from those presented in the model. In fact, mayors 
who face re-election possibilities may prefer to target potential swing voters regardless of their 
children’s risk of dropping out of school in order to garner support from this group (Besley and 
Kanbur, 1993). In this case, the program would perform worse in municipalities with first-term 
mayors. Here again, observing better first-term program performance has to come from electoral 
incentives especially if elections induce first-term clientelism games. 
 
III. The Bolsa Escola program 
 
Primary and secondary education are compulsory in Brazil for children ages 6 to 15 and, as a 
consequence, enrollment at the beginning of the school year is almost universal (Souza, 2005). 
But high enrollment rates hide a major problem in that a large number of children dropout of 
school during the school year, only to re-enroll in the following year as required by law.
3 This 
induced the Brazilian government to introduce an educational CCT program, Bolsa Escola, that 
offered mothers in poor households a monthly stipend conditional on their children ages 6 to 15 
attending school on a regular basis. Households with a monthly per capita income of less than 90 
Reais (around $40) were eligible. The transfer was R15 per child with a maximum of R45 per 
                                                 
3 In our sample, 98 percent of the children that dropped out at some point during the year registered again in school 
in some later year. 
8 household.
4 While the eligibility and conditionality rules were similar to those of other 
educational CCT programs such as Mexico’s Oportunidades, a distinguishing feature of the 
Bolsa Escola program is that it was decentralized at the municipal level. Each municipality 
received a quota of stipends it could provide to its population. This quota was determined on a 
formula basis using indicators from the 1996 population census. Municipalities were responsible 
for identifying all households below the poverty line with children that met the program’s 
requirements. Because the number of qualified households generally exceeded the quota, it was 
also the municipality’s responsibility to select program beneficiaries among qualifying 
households. Transfers to the selected beneficiaries were made directly by Brasilia to their bank 
accounts at the program’s set level with no municipal discretion. Municipalities were entrusted 
with enforcing the school attendance conditionality.
5 The program was implemented across all of 
Brazil in 2001 and incorporated in 2004 into the current Bolsa Familia program (Lindert, Linder, 
Hobbs, and de la Brière, 2006). 
  Bolsa Escola was first conceived in the Federal District of Brasilia and extended to cities 
like Recife, before being scaled up into a national program. Two studies have analyzed these 
earlier forms of the program. For the Federal District, Abramovay, Andrade, and Waiselfisz 
(1998) found that dropout rates were 7 percentage points lower for beneficiary children than for 
children of non-beneficiary families.  For the city of Recife, Aguiar and Araújo (2002) found that 
dropout rates were 0.4 percent among beneficiaries in 1996 compared to 5.6 percent among non-
beneficiary children, a gain of 5.2 percentage points. These results are of the same order of 
magnitude as those which we report here even though these early programs were somewhat 
different from the federal program as transfers were higher and the program’s requirements were 
weakly enforced. Using municipal-level data, Glewwe and Kassouf (2008) find that Bolsa 
Escola/Familia once extended at the national scale reduced dropout rates by about 8 percentage 
points for children in grades 1-4 but did not impact the dropout rates of children in grades 5-8.
6 
                                                 
4 As a comparison, the minimum wage was R240 per month. 
5 Every three months, teachers were required to compile the monthly attendance of program beneficiaries and send 
them to the Secretary of Education of the municipality and Brasilia. It is from these attendance sheets that the 
conditionality was imposed.  
6 Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite (2003) provided an ex-ante evaluation of Bolsa Ecola. Using a simulation model 
based on observed child schooling responses to labor market wages estimated from the PNAD data, they find that 
over 50 percent of the children of poor households would respond to the incentives of the program.  This implies 
halving the pre-program dropout rate, again a result not far from our own estimates. 
9   The present evaluation of Bolsa Escola uses a rigorous identification of impact based on 
observed individual child responses to the incentives provided by the CCT. Measurements are 
obtained both overall and for each municipality for the 2001-2003 period. We then use these 
measures of municipal performance to analyze the importance of electoral incentives and of local 
governance practices on observed outcomes. Identification of electoral incentives on 
performance is provided by the fact that introduction of Bolsa Escola in 2001 happened 
exogenously relative to the first or second term status of the current mayor. Electoral outcomes 
are observed in the subsequent municipal election held in 2004. 
 
IV. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
Data collection for the project took place between October and December of 2004 in 261 
municipalities randomly selected across the states of Ceará, Pernambuco, Paraíba, and Rio 
Grande do Norte in the Brazilian Northeast.
7 In each of the 261 municipalities, two data 
collection instruments were applied – compilation of school records and a municipal survey –, 
complemented by secondary data on the municipality regarding Bolsa Escola payment records 
and electoral outcomes. 
 
School records 
  To properly measure the effects of Bolsa Escola on school dropout, we collected in each 
municipality school records for at least 500 children over the 1999-2003 period.
8 To gather these 
records, one or two schools were randomly drawn proportionately to the number of Bolsa Escola 
recipients (this number was obtained from the payments records of the Ministry of Education) 
within each selected municipality. Information on the enrollment status of each child in the 
school was compiled from the annual class reports filled in by teachers. Matching records across 
school years was done manually using children’s first and last names, allowing us to match 85 
                                                 
7 The municipalities of these four states were stratified according to their land inequality, size of public sector, and 
quota of program beneficiaries; and were randomly sampled from 8 strata.  The sample was stratified to capture 
sufficient variation along variables that may be correlated with governance and importance of the program. 
8 The school year in Brazil runs from February to December. We thus observe two complete years before the 
program (1999 and 2000) and three complete years with the program (2001 to 2003). 
10 percent of the collected records.
9 In total, we can follow the school performance for 290,517 
children in primary and secondary school over part or all of five years, giving us 604,561 data 
points.
10 
In the class reports, which are compiled at the end of each school year, teachers provide 
the full list of students who started the year, and then indicate, by the end of the year, if a child 
has passed the grade, failed the grade, transferred to another school, dropped out of school, or 
died.
11 Thus, our measure of dropout indicates any child that did not complete the school year, 
but neither transferred to another school nor died. It is not related to the attendance records 
reported to the Bolsa Escola administration. 
Although administrative records have the advantage of providing a large data set with 
greater accuracy than self-reported information on attendance and grade promotion, not having 
conducted household interviews results in at least two shortcomings. First, we do not have 
information on children and household characteristics. And while the use of child fixed-effects 
eliminates any biases associated with our inability to control for time invariant characteristic of 
the child and his family, lack of information prevents us from exploring how the impacts vary 
according to these characteristics. Moreover, we cannot investigate whether the program was 
targeted according to certain observable characteristics of children, other than their prior school 
attendance and achievement status. Secondly, we cannot follow children who transfer out of the 
school. However, we can observe if the child transferred to another school (as opposed to being 
reported as missing school), and we see that less than four percent of the children who dropped 
out had transferred. In the analysis that follows, we simply removed these children from the 
sample. 
Table 1 demonstrates the magnitude of the school dropout problem that Bolsa Escola was 
designed to address. It presents the school dropout rates of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries by 
year for the sample of children who were enrolled both in 1999 and 2000, which represents our 
                                                 
9 The remaining 15 percent include cases where the child either left school without this being recorded; or the 
child’s name was simply changed, incomplete, or unreadable. With no discernable pattern in the occurrence these 
cases across grades, it is unlikely that any of these reasons could be correlated with being a stipend recipient. Also 
restricting the estimation to the balanced-panel of children yields similar results.  
10 The target was to have at least 500 current students per municipality, which led to an average of 1100 students in 
the school records as many schools are large and we collected information on all students attending school at any 
point in time during the 1999-2002 period. 
11 The class records are not electronic and not shared with Bolsa Escola. They do not report on daily school 
attendance to meet Bolsa Escola conditionality, where cheating could occur. 
11 main estimation sample. In 2000, the year before the program started, 9.3 percent of non-
beneficiary children dropped out of school during the course of the year (see column 3). This 
percentage increases over time and by 2003, 15.4 percent of the sample had dropped out at some 
point during the school year. The steady increase over time reflects the fact that these children 
are getting older and are much more likely to dropout at higher grades.  
The dropout behavior of non-beneficiaries stands in stark contrast to that of program 
beneficiaries whose dropout rates range from 2 to 6.1 percent during the period.  This 
comparison not only provides some initial insights into the program’s impact, but also reveals 
the extent of selection that occurred in the program’s targeting. For instance, only 3.1 percent of 
the program beneficiaries had dropped out in the year prior to introduction of the program.  
Given that the program was targeted to children with lower dropout propensities, the use 
of child fixed effects in estimating the program’s impact becomes critical to account for this 
initial selection. This can be seen clearly in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1. In column 4, we present 
the unadjusted difference-in-differences estimate by year. Although the estimates during the 
post-program years suggest that Bolsa Escola reduced dropout rates among program 
beneficiaries by about 5 percentage points, we also see a 2.4 percentage points decline even prior 
to the program which raises concerns for our counterfactual assumption of parallel trends. 
However, in column 5, we see the importance of including child fixed-effects. Under this 
specification, there is no difference in the change in dropout rates between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries prior to introduction of the program. Moreover, the difference is not only 
statistically insignificant but small in magnitude (point estimate = -0.002; robust standard error = 
0.002). Given the tightness of the confidence intervals, we can reject impacts of -0.006. This is 
an order of magnitude smaller than the estimated impact of the program during the post-program 
years, which are large and statistically significant, ranging from -0.065 to -0.091.  
 
Bolsa Escola eligibility and beneficiary status 
  In our school visits, teachers were asked to identify what percentage of children was 
eligible for Bolsa Escola. In every school, teachers identified more than 97 percent of the 
12 children as qualifying for the program.
12 We therefore consider all the children as eligible. As we 
will see later, the identification strategy does not depend on strict eligibility of all children. 
  We obtained the complete list of beneficiaries from the Bolsa Escola federal office for the 
years 2001 and 2002. For each household, records include parents’ and children’s names, and the 
school attended by the child. Matching these beneficiaries to the school information gives the 
beneficiary status of all the children in the school records. Matching was again done manually 
using children’s full names (last names of both parents and first name of the child). Beneficiary 
status in 2003 can safely be assumed to be the same as in the previous two years as no 
reselection was undertaken in that or prior years.  
  We have no independent information to confirm the non-beneficiary status of children in 
the school records that we could not match with the Bolsa Escola list, and we could not match 
25% of the Bolsa Escola list into school records. Matching errors may thus entail beneficiary 
children misclassified as non-beneficiaries. This would imply that we estimate a lower bound for 
the impact of the program.   
 
Municipal data 
  The municipal survey contained several parts designed to gather general information on 
municipal and mayor characteristics and governance practices, and implementation methods for 
the Bolsa Escola program. Designated respondents for the various sections of the questionnaire 
were mostly public administrators, but also included politicians and key members of civil 
society, such as the local priest or the president of the labor union. For questions on Bolsa 
Escola, we interviewed the corresponding program coordinator about how the municipality 
identified and selected beneficiaries, and monitored and enforced the conditionalities.  
Overall we found considerable variation across municipalities in the procedures used to 
identify and register potential beneficiaries. Differences relate to where the registration of 
potential beneficiaries took place, whether efforts were made to verify the information given by 
parents, and whether the municipality had social councils that could engage in deliberating 
                                                 
12 That 97 percent of the children were qualified for the program is not surprising given both the public school 
system in Brazil, which is almost exclusively attended by poor children, and the fact that we sampled schools with 
probability proportional to the number of Bolsa recipients. The Northeast of Brazil is also the region with the highest 
incidence of poverty. 
13 program implementation.
13 The number of potential beneficiaries largely exceeded the quota of 
stipends that was allocated to the municipality by the federal government. On average, an 
estimated 49 percent of eligible households were left out of the program, leaving it to the 
municipality to select the beneficiaries from among the pool of eligible households. There was 
also variation in implementing conditionalities across municipalities. While most municipalities 
reported monitoring the school attendance conditionality, this was done more strictly in some 
municipalities than others. Overall, our survey revealed a great deal of heterogeneity across 
municipalities in program implementation despite definition of rules at the federal level. 
In addition to information on program implementation, the survey was also designed to 
document governance practices. For instance, in our sample of municipalities, we found that in 
25 percent of the municipalities, more than 15 percent of the employees in the mayor’s office 
were related to the mayor indicating nepotism, and in 12 percent of the municipalities, the 
mayor’s spouse was also an elected politician. Across municipalities, 47 percent of the 
administrative positions were held by political appointees rather than technocrats.
14 
  In Table 2, we examine how these governance practices as well as other characteristics of 
the municipality differ across those municipalities governed by a first-term mayor (column 1) 
versus a second-term mayor (column 2). Because of the need to assume selection on observables 
in our second-stage analysis, it is important to understand whether characteristics that are likely 
to affect program performance also differ by the mayor’s term of office. As the table 
demonstrates, there are few differences in observable characteristics between these 
municipalities. Out of the 24 controls that we use for our analysis, there are only 3 characteristics 
which are statistically different at the 10 percent level (see column 3). As expected, second-term 
mayors have much more terms of experience and a larger margin of victory in the 2000 
elections. We also see that second-term mayors exhibit more nepotism as they are more likely to 
hire their own relatives to work in the mayor’s office. Aside from these differences, the other 
characteristics of both the mayor (e.g., gender, education) and of the municipality (e.g., income 
per capita, income inequality, and access to media) are all balanced. 
                                                 
13 See de Janvry, Finan, Sadoulet, Nelson, Lindert, de la Brière, and Lanjouw (2005) for details on these procedures. 
14 Throughout Brazil’s political history, there has been a clear distinction between political appointees or “traditional 
politicians” and technocrats (técnicos) who are appointed individuals with non-political backgrounds (see Hagopian, 
1996). 
14   In Table 2, we also examine differences in pre-program dropout propensities between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries and whether these differences differed between first and 
second-term mayors. To measure a child’s propensity to dropout prior to the program, we 
estimate the following model of school dropout, S , for child i in municipality j in period t:  ijt
  , for t=1999 and 2000,  Sijt = φij +γ 1jT00 +γ 2 j Si99 ×T00 () + εijt
where T  is a time dummy for the year 2000, S  is child i’s 1999 dropout status, and  00 i99 εijt  is a 
random error term. We then define the municipal-specific child fixed-effect, φij , as child i’s 
propensity to drop out of school prior to introduction of the program.  
  The difference in dropout propensities between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is 
only slightly lower among first-term mayors relative to second-term mayors, and this difference 
is not statistically significant. We also do not find any difference in pre-program dropout rates 
between first and second-term mayors. 
 
V. Measuring program performance 
 
In this section, we present the econometric specifications used to estimate the impact of the 
Bolsa Escola program on dropout rates. Given the data and research design, the impact of the 
program on beneficiaries can be estimated for every municipality in the sample. It is this 
program impact that provides a measure of municipal program performance for the analysis of 
electoral incentives. 
The empirical strategy to measure the effect of Bolsa Escola on the selected beneficiaries 
for each municipality uses panel data on children before and after the start of the program, and 
proceeds with a number of tests to verify robustness of the results. 
We start with a standard difference-in-differences model where schooling outcome is 
modeled as: 
  Sijt =φij + Xijtβ +θijP ijt +εijt,         ( 1 )  
15 where  is schooling outcome (dropout),  Sijt φij
P
is an individual fixed effect,  are time varying 
observables including year fixed effects, and   is an indicator for program participation.
Xijt
ijt
15 θij  
is a random coefficient that measures the gain for individual ij from participating in the program, 
and  εijt  an unobserved shock to schooling assumed unrelated to program participation 
conditional on  .   Xijt
  With this model for individual behavior, the treatment on the treated ( TT)  effect in 
municipality j is given by: 
  θ j = E θij Bij =1 ( ),         ( 2 )  
where the conditioning on   denotes that the individual ij is a beneficiary. This expression 
highlights the sources of differentiation in average TT effects across municipalities. Municipal 
treatment effects may thus differ due to both their selection of beneficiaries from amongst the 
population and the distribution of individual effects 
Bij =1
θij  in their eligible population.   
The validity of this identification strategy relies on the assumption that, conditional on 
individual fixed-effects, the trend in future dropout behavior of beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries would be the same in the absence of the Bolsa Escola program. Given that the 
process of selection of beneficiaries was done only once at the onset of the program in 2001, the 
concern is not that beneficiaries could be brought into the program in response to unanticipated 
shocks after the program had started. The main concern is that the selection decision was based 
on pre-program schooling outcomes.  
  To address this concern, we include in   differential time effects by pre-program 
dropout histories   which are the best predictors of future dropout behavior. The estimation of 
Xijt
Sij0
θ j  can be obtained by rewriting equation (1) as follows: 
  Sijt =φij + βjt +γ jtSij0 + θ j +θ j
* Sij0 − Sj0 ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦P ijt + μijt,   ( 3 )  
where μijt = θij −θ j −θ
* Sij0 − Sj0 () () P ijt +εijt , θ j
∗ = E θij Bij =1,Sij0 =1 ( )− E θij Bij =1,Sij0 = 0 ( ), 
Sj0 = ES ij0 Bij =1 ( ), and β jt  and γ jtSij0  denote different sets of year effects. 
                                                 
15 There is no distinction between participating in the program and being offered the program because take-up rates 
are 100 percent. 
16   The estimator is consistent if Ε θij −θ j −θ
∗ Sij0 − Sj0 ( ) ( )P ijt + εijt φij,β jt,γ jtSij0,P ijt ( )= 0 . 
The first term Ε θij −θ j −θ
∗ Sij0 − Sj0 () () P ijt φij,β jt,γ jtSij0,P ijt ( ) , which accounts for the difference 
between the child specific effect and the common effect conditional on  , is null by 
construction. Hence the estimator for the TT effect is consistent if 
Sij0
ijt φij, Ε ε βjt,γ jtSij0,P ijt ( )= 0.   
  This specification thus provides an unbiased estimate of the TT effect when the selection 
of beneficiaries is based on an individual’s fixed characteristics, time fixed effects specific to the 
pre-treatment dropout histories, or of course any other variable unrelated to school dropout 
behavior. In this specification, the average impact of the program on the selected children of a 
municipality is identified by within-person comparisons of changes in dropout rates with that of 
non-beneficiary children of the municipality with the same pre-program dropout status.
16 In the 
empirical analysis, pre-program status is observed in both 1999 and 2000. With this approach, 
we estimate an average TT impact for each municipality.   
  To further justify our identification assumption, we present two additional robustness 
tests. First, we re-estimate the model in equation (1) matching on beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries with the exact same pre-program dropout histories (Card and Sullivan, 1988).   
While similar to equation (3), this model relaxes the functional form assumption and restricts the 
estimates to areas of common support. Second, with two years of pre-program data, we compare 
the changes in dropout rates between 1999 and 2000 for future beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries. This is given by the difference-in-difference estimator for each municipality as 
follows: 
  Sijt =αij +γ jT00 +θ jBijT00 + μijt , for t =1999, 2000 ,   (4) 
where   represents the status of future beneficiary and T  is a dummy variable for year 2000. 
This allows us to not only test for differential trends in pre-program dropout behavior between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, but also to test whether the program effects are different 
when we restrict the estimation sample to those municipalities without differential pre-program 
trends. Thus, our final specification estimates the program effects conditional on child fixed-
Bij 00
                                                 
16 This will control for any reversion to the mean if selection was based on the dropout status. Note that in this 
particular case, where beneficiaries have much lower dropout rate than non-beneficiaries, a reversion to the mean 
would suggest that we were under-estimating the program’s impact. 
17 effects, and differential time effects by pre-program dropout histories, and for the subset of 
municipalities where pre-program trends in dropout behavior were not different between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. 
 
VI. The impact of Bosla Escola on dropout rates 
 
In this section, we first report the estimation of the average impact over all municipalities in the 
sample. The estimated impact is robust to various empirical specifications and robustness checks. 
We then report the variation in program impacts across municipalities.  
 
Average impact on dropout rates 
  Table 3 presents regression results from estimating several variants to equation (3), where 
the dependent variable is a binary variable for whether or not the child drops out of school during 
the school year as reported in the school records. Column (1) presents an estimate of the 
treatment effect that only includes year and individual child fixed effects. Under this 
specification, Bolsa Escola reduced dropout rates among beneficiary children by 5.7 percentage 
points.  But, as we discussed above, a causal interpretation of this estimate assumes that program 
beneficiaries were not selected based on pre-program dropout behavior.  
In columns (2) to (5), we relax this assumption by extending the fixed-effects model to 
allow for children with different pre-treatment dropout status to experience different year effects 
(equation (3) above). In column (2), the model allows for different year effects based on dropout 
status in 2000 (the year before the program started), whereas the model presented in column (3) 
allows for time effects to vary with both child 1999 and 2000 dropout status. Column (4) 
presents a model that allows for separate time effects for each of the four possible combinations 
of dropout histories in 1999 and 2000. Column (5) presents the most flexible specification. Here 
we estimate the model presented in column (1) separately for each of the four dropout histories 
and compute the overall treatment effect by weighting the results for each of the individual 
dropout histories by the sample fractions. 
Overall, the estimates suggest that Bolsa Escola reduced dropout rates by around 8 
percentage points for its selected beneficiaries. The point estimates are highly statistically 
significant and change little across the various specifications. The results imply that if it were not 
18 for the program, we would have observed a dropout rate of 12 percent instead of the 4 percent 
observed among beneficiaries in 2001-2003. The program thus induced a substantial 66% 
percent decline in dropout.  
Columns (6) and (7) present further robustness checks by restricting the sample to 
municipalities where pre-program trends verify the assumption underlying the identification. In 
column (6), the estimation is performed on the 194 municipalities where the pre-program 
differences in change in dropout rates between (future) beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are 
not significantly different. In column (7), we restrict the sample to the 111 municipalities where 
beneficiaries had a higher increase in dropout rates than non-beneficiaries in the pre-program 
period. In both cases, the estimated impact on beneficiaries is basically the same as when 
estimated on the whole sample in columns (2) to (5).   
To further verify that the program’s impact is not confounded with possible differential 
quitting rates for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, we estimated the treatment effect on the 
sub-sample of 16564 children enrolled in all 5 years. Note that this sample has a different age 
structure than the population at large, with no older children in the earlier years and no young 
children in the later years. However, the results (not reported in the table) are quite similar, with 
an estimated TT effect of -5.6 percentage points in spite of a very different population sample. 
 
Estimation of municipal-level impacts on dropout rates 
  The Bolsa Escola program reduced dropout rates by 8 percentage points on average. 
Program impact varies, however, considerably across municipalities. Our survey design allows to 
us estimate an impact θ j  of the program for each municipality j. Figure 1 presents the frequency 
distribution of these program impacts θ j  on dropout rates, using the econometric specification 
presented in column 2 of Table 3 for each of the 261 municipalities. The distribution of impacts 
is skewed towards negative values with a median impact of -6.7 percentage points. While the 
estimated impacts range from -25.5 to 10.7 percentage points, over 95 percent are negative. In 
addition to the distribution of unbiased estimates of impact, Figure 1 plots the absolute values of 
the corresponding t-statistics. Each circle represents the estimated impact for one municipality, 
with the point estimate reported on the horizontal axis and its corresponding t-statistic on the 
19 vertical axis. Few positive impacts are measured precisely.
17 Over 55 percent of the estimates are 
significantly negative at the 5 percent level and 65 percent at the 10 percent level. Given the 
substantial variation in program performance across municipalities, a natural question to ask is to 
what extent electoral incentives affect program performance across municipalities. 
 
VII. Impact of electoral incentives on municipal program performance 
 
In this section, we provide evidence consistent with theory that the program performed better in 
municipalities where mayors faced re-election incentives. To estimate these effects of electoral 
accountability, we compare the program’s impact on dropout rates in municipalities where the 
mayor happened to be serving in his first term (and hence could be re-elected) to those where the 
mayor happened to be serving in his second (and thus final) term at the time when the program 
was introduced. Although the difference in program impacts between first and second-term 
mayors will capture the effects of re-election incentives, as we discussed in Section II, it is 
potentially confounded by at least two factors. First, given that second-term mayors are a 
selected group, it is likely that they are more politically able than first-term mayors. If political 
ability is positively correlated with program performance, then the simple difference will be 
biased upwards, meaning that we will underestimate the reduction in dropout rate.
  18 Second, 
second-term mayors by construction have more consecutive years of experience in office than 
first-term. Without controlling for these potential differences in experience, estimates will again 
be upwardly biased. To see this more explicitly, consider the following regression model:  
  θ j = α + β
∗Rj + X jδ +γ 1Abilityj +γ 2Experiencej + ε j ,    (5) 
where   is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the mayor is in his first term, the   are municipal 
and mayor characteristics, and   is expected to be negative if first-term mayors obtain a higher 




γ 1 and γ 2 are negative, then  , where  β > β
∗ β  is the 
                                                 
17 As can be seen in Figure 1, only one positive impact is significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent level and 
the rest have an average t-statistic of 0.80.  
18 This assumes that elections create a positive selection on high ability mayors. If, on the other hand, elections 
select the most populist candidates and populism was negatively correlated with ability then second-term mayors 
would be on average less able than first-term mayors. In this case, we would be over-estimating the effects of re-
election incentives on program performance. While this is a possibility, the results that we present both in this 
section and in the following one are inconsistent with this assumption. 
20 first-term effect on performance without controlling for ability and experience. Not controlling 
(or controlling incompletely) for ability and experience would thus yield an upward bias. The 
favorable effect of first-term on the decline in dropout rate would be under-estimated. 
These biases may not be of concern in identifying the role of electoral incentives on 
performance as they affect performance in the opposite direction. However, to account for these 
potential biases, we follow Ferraz and Finan (2009) and employ two strategies. First, we 
compare second-term mayors to the set of first-term mayors who were re-elected in the 
subsequent election. If the bias from the OLS regression comes from unobserved political ability 
that positively selects more able politicians into a second-term, this approach controls for a 
significant portion of this bias by comparing mayors that are as politically able as second-term 
mayors. Second, in comparing first and second-term mayors, we can account for the effects of 
political experience by restricting the sample to first-term mayors that have had at least two 
terms of political experience in another office.  
There is another confounding factor for which we cannot control, but it would again 
increase second term performance, running opposite to our electoral incentives model. Mayors 
may control other resources that they can use to compensate qualifying households who did not 
receive a Bolsa Escola stipend in a way that induces them to stay at school. This would lower the 
estimated impact of Bolsa Escola on drop out. If first-term mayors are more likely to compensate 
non-beneficiaries because of re-election incentives, we would be under-estimating the impact of 
electoral incentives on performance.  
  Table 4 presents regression results from estimating several specifications based on 
equation (5), and where the sample is restricted to the set of municipalities for which we have a 
full set of covariates.
19 The dependent variable in each regression is the program’s impact on 
                                                 
19 We purposefully chose to first estimate the program impacts at the municipality level and then estimate the impact 
of mayors’ electoral status on these impacts, because this is what best corresponds to the fact that municipalities are 
independent of each others in their management of the program. The alternative of a joint estimation over all 
municipalities, such as S , implies assuming a distribution for  ijt = φij + θ1 +θ2Rj () P ijt + μijt μijt  that is common 
to all ijt observations, which is not the same as assuming one distribution per municipality in the model 
Sijt =φij +θ jP ijt + μijt . Although the OLS estimators of these two models need not yield the same estimates, as 
they verify S = φ + ˆ θ1P + ˆ θ2RP  and S =φ + ˆ θ1 + ˆ θ2R ( )Pj , respectively, our results are similar using either 
approach. Moreover, because this two-step estimator will induce heteroskedasticity in the second-stage estimation, 
we allow for an arbitrary form of heteroskedasticity in computing our standard errors (Hanushek 1974). 
21 dropout rate for a particular municipality, which we estimated based on the model presented in 
equation (3).
20 Column (1) reports the unadjusted relationship between program impact and 
whether the mayor happens to be in his first term which shows a 2 percentage points gain in 
reducing dropout. Columns (2) and (3) include additional sets of controls. In column (2), we 
account for differences in municipal and mayor characteristics and introduce state fixed effects. 
Column (3) includes other municipal characteristics that although endogenously determined 
might proxy for some unobserved determinants of program performance. As seen across both 
columns, the inclusion of these additional controls has virtually no effect on the original 
estimate. For instance under the most flexible specification (column 3), the point estimate is -
0.021 which is statistically significant at the 1% level. This stability of the parameter to the 
addition of many mayor and municipal characteristics gives confidence that the estimated effect 
is likely not due to omitted variable bias. At an average impact of -6.7 percentage points across 
all municipalities – with -7.9 percentage points in municipalities with first term mayors and -5.9 
percentage points in municipalities with second term mayors – this 2.1 percentage points gain in 
program performance corresponds to a 36 percent better performance for first term mayors.  
  In columns (4) and (5), we examine the extent to which political ability and experience 
may be biasing our results. Column (4) reports the results from the comparison of first-term 
mayors that were re-elected in the subsequent 2004 elections to the subset of second-term 
mayors. Using this sample of mayors, we find that re-election incentives improve program 
performance by 2.6 percentage points, which is statistically similar to our base specification. To 
account for any potential differences in experience between first and second-term mayors, we 
compare in column (5) the subset of first-term mayors that have had at least 2 terms of political 
experience as either a local legislator or a state or federal congressman to second-term mayors.  
Although we control for political experience in column (2) (and find that the estimates are 
robust), this comparison excludes first-term mayors that have less political experience than 
second-term mayors.  The results are consistent with the previous specifications.  
  Column (6) in Table 4 introduces governance practices that are correlated with program 
impact. The program performs worse in municipalities with higher levels of nepotism or 
                                                 
20 Specifically, we estimate the program’s impact separately for each municipality, controlling for time and child 
fixed-effects and the child’s 1999 and 2000 dropout status interacted with time dummies. The average impact of the 
program using this specification, which is more flexible than those presented in Table 3, and for this sample of 
municipalities is -0.067.  
22 cronyism, as measured by whether the mayor’s spouse is also a politician, the share of 
employees in the mayor’s office who are related to the mayor, and the share of secretariat 
members who are politicians rather than technicians (positive but not significant). Even though 
these governance practices are slightly more common among second-term mayors (see Table 2), 
we find that even after accounting for these symptomatic features of bad governance the effects 
of re-election incentives remains unaltered. 
  As an additional test of robustness, we also compare first-term mayors to the set of 
second-term mayors that became candidates in the subsequent 2006 and 2008 elections.
21 If re-
election incentives explain the difference in program performance between first and second-term 
mayors, then we also would expect second-term mayors who were anticipating on running for 
other political offices to behave similarly to first-term mayors. Although we unfortunately do not 
have a measure of a mayor’s ex-ante desire to run for other political offices, we do find that 
second-term mayors who did run for other political offices (ex-post) had similar program 
performances to that of first-term mayors. For instance, conditional on running in the 2006 and 
2008 elections, the difference between first-term and second-second mayors is only -0.003 
(compared to -0.020 in our main specification). Although this result should be interpreted with 
caution given that the program’s impact may have also induced some second-term mayors to run 
for office, it provides further evidence consistent with a re-election incentive interpretation.  
 
VIII. Interpreting the results 
 
In interpreting the results, there are two issues that need to be verified. The first is that there are 
indeed electoral rewards to good program performance, suggesting that the electorate is informed 
about performance and cares about it in casting their votes. The second is to explore what do 
first-term mayors do to achieve a higher performance. 
 
Electoral rewards to good program performance 
  The results thus far correspond to a simple model of political agency. It requires that 
voters are informed of and care about the program’s impact, and that mayors with re-election 
                                                 
21 Ten percent of mayors in our sample ran in the 2006 elections for state and federal deputies, senators, and 
governors. Twenty-five percent of the mayors were candidates in the 2008 elections for mayor and local 
councilmen.   
23 incentives exert effort on program delivery in order to increase their chances of re-election. A 
prediction of this model is that first-term mayors are more likely to get re-elected in 
municipalities where the program performed better. Clearly, re-election responds to the quality 
of performance in a broader set of public functions which are presumably correlated with 
effective management of the Bolsa Escola program (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). 
Figure 2 shows a non-parametric estimate of the unconditional relationship between 
program impact and probability of reelection among incumbent mayors in the 2004 election. It 
indicates a clear upward trend for mayors who have achieved a program impact below -0.09, 
which corresponds to the top 25 percent in the distribution of program impacts.  
We verify this result in a regression framework in Table 5. The electorate may have 
difficulty recognizing a mayor’s program performance (as can be seen from the non-significant 
coefficients in columns (1) and (2)), unless performance is outstanding. This would be the case 
for the top 25 percent mayors with the largest program impacts (columns (3) and (4)). We see 
that these incumbent mayors have a 28 percent greater chance of being re-elected. The electorate 
can also see how the program was administered, in particular whether children that did not 
qualify were included (type II error).
22 The results in columns (5) and (6) show that mayors with 
no public denouncements of inclusion errors have a 26 percent higher chance of re-election. 
When put together in columns (7) and (8), these results are robust. We can thus conclude that re-
election is associated with good performance in managing Bolsa Escola in accordance with 
federal program objectives, likely symptomatic of good performance in broader public functions 
as well. The electorate thus appears to be informed about program performance and concerned 
with it in casting their votes in local elections. 
 
What do first-term mayors do to achieve a higher performance? 
Mayors have considerable leeway in choosing the institutional set up to implement the 
Bolsa Escola program, and there are large variations in practices across municipalities. Some of 
these practices are clearly associated with better and worse program performance. The question 
is whether the positive correlates of performance are more prevalent with first than second-term 
mayors, and correspondingly the negative correlates less prevalent.  
                                                 
22 Our measure of public denouncement is an indicator for whether or not a member of the community had 
complained to the secretary of education that a household above the income threshold is benefitting from the 
program. Fifty-eight percent of the municipalities in our sample experienced a complaint.  
24 Many of the municipal practices that are associated with a higher program impact have to 
do with greater transparency in program implementation. As can be seen in panel A of Table 6, 
this includes registering beneficiaries in schools as opposed to less neutral sites such as the 
mayor’s office. It also involves verifying the information given by parents about their self-
declared poverty status. And it implies having social councils composed of citizens and public 
officials that can effectively deliberate implementation procedures. All these practices bear 
positively on program performance, reducing the dropout rate. In terms of enforcement of 
program rules, the practice associated with lower dropout rates involves not sending a program 
coordinator to visit the household when conditionalities are not met as opposed to strict 
application of rules. Panel B of Table 6 shows that these favorable practices in program 
implementation (e.g., a deliberative social council) are used more frequently by first-term 
mayors, and unfavorable practices (coordinator visits) less frequently, suggesting the channels 




Bolsa Escola, subsequently incorporated in the current Bolsa Familia, was a decentralized 
conditional cash transfer program aimed at reducing school drop-out rates among the children of 
the poor in Brazil, with municipal authorities in charge of program implementation. The federal 
government thus sought to achieve higher program performance by entrusting local politicians 
with the selection of beneficiaries and the enforcement of rules. The expectation is that this gives 
politicians the opportunity of using local information and citizens the opportunity of holding 
local politicians accountable for program performance, thereby creating an incentive for 
politicians with re-election concerns to increase effort in achieving high program performance. 
The Bolsa Escola experience is thus symptomatic of a broad trend toward increasing 
decentralization in the provision of local public goods. Because the program was introduced 
exogenously relative to whether the local mayor was in his first or terminal second term, it 
provides a rare opportunity to understand empirically how local electoral incentives offered by 
re-election can affect decentralized program performance.  
  We find that, while Bolsa Escola had a strong overall impact on beneficiary school 
attendance, reducing dropout rates by 8 percentage points, municipalities governed by mayors 
25 with re-election incentives fared much better. Compared to mayors in their second and final 
term, first-term mayors achieved a 36 percent greater program impact. This finding is robust to 
the introduction of state fixed effects, municipal and mayor characteristics, and indicators of 
local governance practices. It is also robust to comparing the performance of first-term mayors 
who will win re-election, or of those with similar political experience, to that of second-term 
mayors. In addition, remaining effects on performance due to ability and experience run opposite 
to the electoral incentive effect, and would induce a downward bias on the estimate of this effect. 
The same applies to other factors that can affect mayors’ performance such as compensating 
non-beneficiaries with other resources and seeking first-term clientelistic gains in selecting 
children.  
Consistent with model predictions, we see that superior performance is rewarded in 
elections, indicating that the electorate is informed of and concerned with program performance 
in casting their votes at re-election time. Mayors with the 25 percent highest program impacts 
have a 28 percent greater chance of re-election. Those with no public denouncements of 
illegitimate inclusion of beneficiaries have a 26 percent higher probability of being re-elected. 
First-term mayors are more likely to adopt specific program implementation practices that are 
not only more transparent but also associated with superior program performance.  
Overall our findings support the proposition that electoral incentives can play a central 
role in the success of decentralized delivery of local public goods. The presence of formal local 
institutions, particularly electoral rules that enable voters to reward and punish locally-elected 
officials, is key for reaping the benefits that decentralization can provide. When constitutional 
rules do not support electoral accountability, introducing other mechanisms of political rewards 
and citizen control becomes all the more important. 
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29 Figure 1. Frequency distribution and t-statistics of estimated impacts of Bolsa Escola on 
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Impacts t-statistic
Notes: Each circle represents the impact for one municipality, with the point estimate on the horizontal axis and the 
absolute value of the associated t-statistic on the vertical axis. The horizontal line at t =1.96 delineates the 5 percent 
significance level. The frequency distribution is of the impact point estimates in the sample of municipalities. 
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Program Impacts
Notes: The figure shows reelection rates in 2004 by program impact. The plot presents the proportion of first-term 
mayors that were re-elected in 2004 for a bin size of 0.01 impact (circles) along with a locally weighted regression 
calculated with a bandwidth of 0.8. Municipalities to the left of the vertical line were in the top 25 percent in terms 
of program impact. 





(base year = 1999)
Difference-in-differen
(base year = 1999)
Year dropout Beneficiary Non-beneficiary OLS Fixed-effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1999 0.182 0.020 0.058
2000 0.228 0.031 0.093 -0.024 -0.002
[0.003] [0.002]
2001 0.236 0.026 0.112 -0.048 -0.065
[0.003] [0.002]
2002 0.246 0.040 0.133 -0.055 -0.084
[0.003] [0.002]
2003 0.256 0.061 0.154 -0.055 -0.091
[0.004] [0.003]
Dropout rates
Notes: Dropout is defined as dropping out before the end of the school year. The sample includes 118,234 children 
who were enrolled both in 1999 and 2000. “Beneficiaries” refers to children who benefited from the program in 
2001-03. Column 4 reports the difference-in-differences estimates by year using 1999 as a base year. Column 5 
reports the difference-in-differences estimates by year using 1999 as a base year with child fixed-effects.  
 
  
32 Table 2. Summary statistics of mayors and municipalities 
 
 








Male 0.882 0.939 0.17
Has a primary education  0.848 0.815 0.55
Has a high school education 0.818 0.745 0.22
Has a college education 0.603 0.505 0.18
Age of mayor 0.482 0.490 0.46
Terms of experience 2.295 2.705 0.02
Margin of victory in 2000 elections 0.146 0.221 0.00
Municipal characteristics
Population density 0.001 0.001 0.61
Number of districts 0.029 0.032 0.27
Share of rural population 0.444 0.475 0.23
Literacy rate 0.676 0.668 0.34
Income per capita (logs) 4.226 4.185 0.15
Gini coefficient 0.526 0.518 0.48
An NGO exists 0.315 0.350 0.65
Share of population employed by public sector 0.043 0.043 0.53
Judiciary district 0.618 0.553 0.20
Number of radio stations 0.680 0.645 0.85
Has local newspapers 0.209 0.130 0.54
Administrative characteristics
Received Bolsa Escola training 0.205 0.218 0.91
Bolsa Escola council exists 0.790 0.819 0.78
Wife is politician 0.158 0.099 0.27
Degree of nepotism 0.011 0.021 0.09
Share of administrative positions held by a political appointee 0.441 0.503 0.24
Number of secretaries  0.159 0.177 0.32
Program implementation
Average dropout rates prior to the program 0.146 0.136 0.41
Difference in pre-program dropout propensities -0.114 -0.106 0.18
Registered beneficiaries in schools 0.861 0.832 0.78
Received visit from program coordinator  0.286 0.533 0.00
Verified information 0.608 0.657 0.00
Proportion of deliberative social councils  0.700 0.609 0.00
Number of municipalities 98 138
Notes: This table presents a comparison of the mean political, mayor, and socio-economic characteristics of 
municipalities with first and second-term mayors. Column 1 reports the means for the 98 municipalities with a first 
term mayor. Column 2 reports the means for the 138 municipalities with a second term mayor. Column 3 reports the 
p-value of the test of difference in means using state fixed effects. 
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Table 3. Average impact of Bolsa Escola on dropout rates 
 
Dependent variable: Dropout (1/0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treatment effect -0.057 -0.080 -0.085 -0.085 -0.096 -0.074 -0.092
[0.003]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.008]**[0.016]**
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dropout status in 2000 * Year effects No Yes Yes n/a n/a n/a n/a
Dropout status in 1999 * Year effects No No Yes n/a n/a n/a n/a
Dropout history * Year effects No No No Yes n/a Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.137 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.114 0.150
Number of children 290517 118234 118234 118234 118234 78737 16437
Observations 604561 344107 344107 344107 344107 229720 33308
R-squared 0.72 0.69 0.73 0.73 n/a 0.68 0.77
Notes: This table reports the effects of Bolsa Escola on dropout rates. The sample in columns (2) to (5) is restricted to children that were enrolled in school in 
1999 and 2000. Samples in columns (6) and (7) correspond to municipalities where differences in pre-program dropout trends for beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries were not statistically different (in col. 6) and greater than 0 (in col. 7). Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets. + 




34 Table 4. Effects of electoral incentives on program performance 
 
Dependent variable: Program's impact on dropout rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mayor in first term -0.020 -0.022 -0.021 -0.026 -0.018 -0.020
[0.008]* [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.009]** [0.010]+ [0.007]**
Governance practices
  Mayor's spouse is a politician 0.018
[0.010]+




Municipal characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mayor characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other municipal characteristics  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable -0.067 -0.067 -0.067 -0.067 -0.064 -0.067
Observations 236 236 236 193 176 236
R-squared 0.03 0.27 0.31 0.38 0.32 0.34
  Share of secretariat that are politicians (vs. technicians)
Notes: This table reports the effects of re-election incentives on program performance. Robust standard errors in brackets. + significant at 10%, * at  5% , and ** 
at 1%. Mayor characteristics include gender, education, number of terms held in a political position, age, and party affiliation dummies. Municipal characteristics 
include population density (pop/km), number of districts, % rural, % literate population, log per capita income, margin of victory in the previous election, and 
Gini coefficient. Other municipal characteristics include existence of an NGO, share of children benefited by the program, municipality is a judiciary district, 
existence of a social council, received training, number of radios, number newspapers, public sector employment (as share of population), total number of 
employees in the mayor’s office, and total number of secretariats. Sample in column (4) restricted to second-term mayors and first-term mayors that will be re-
elected in 2004. Sample in column (5) restricted to second-term mayors and first-term mayors with at least 2 terms of political experience in another office. 
 
  
35 Notes: This table reports the effects of program performance on re-election outcomes. Observations are for the municipalities with incumbent mayor in the 2004 
elections. Robust standard errors in brackets. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Municipal and mayor characteristics as defined in 
footnote of Table 4. 
 
Dependent variable: Mayor was reelected in 2004 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Program impact -1.251 -1.227
[0.866] [1.296]
In top 25 percent of program impacts (0/1) 0.234 0.282 0.249 0.248
[0.108]* [0.142]+ [0.107]* [0.145]+
No public denouncement of Type II (inclusion) errors 0.172 0.261 0.191 0.224
[0.106] [0.131]+ [0.103]+ [0.129]+
Municipal characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mayor characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
R-squared 0.02 0.3 0.05 0.33 0.03 0.33 0.09 0.36
Table 5. Electoral rewards and program performance 
36 Table 6. Electoral incentives, program implementation, and program performance 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Program implementation and performance
Dependent variable:
Registered beneficiaries in schools -0.027
[0.012]*
Verified information given by parents -0.015
[0.007]+




R-squared 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30














Mayor in first term 0.041 -0.020 0.139 -0.199
[0.050] [0.071] [0.057]* [0.072]**
Mean of dependent variable 0.849 0.638 0.645 0.441
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.22
Control for both panel estimations
Municipal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mayor characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other municipal characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 235 236 236
Program performance
Received visit from program coordinator when 
conditionalities were not met
Notes: Panel A reports associations between program implementation methods and program performance. Panel B 
reports the effects of re-election incentives on choice of program implementation method. Robust standard errors in 
brackets. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Municipal and mayor characteristics as 
defined in footnote of Table 4. 
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